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In the judgment of 21 June 2012 in the case of E.S. v. Sweden, concerning the alleged failure of the 
Swedish state to protect a minor against her stepfather attempting to secretly film her naked, the 
European Court of Human Rights has introduced a ‘significant flaw’ test in its positive obligations case-
law. The judgment suggests that the Court will generally not find a violation in a case concerning a 
complaint that a state has failed to discharge its positive obligation to provide a regulatory framework 
and to apply it in practice, unless it is shown that there have been ‘significant flaws’ in the provision or 
application of that framework. The article argues that the Grand Chamber should overrule the Chamber 
judgment and apply a more principled approach to positive obligations, in line with the Court’s prior 
case-law and reaffirming the principles of effectiveness and priority-to-rights. 
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1. Introduction 
 
On 21 June 2012, the Fifth Section of the European Court of Human Rights (the Court) issued its 
judgment in the case of E.S. v. Sweden.1 The applicant complained that the Swedish legal system had 
failed to protect her against her stepfather attempting secretly to film her naked when she was fourteen 
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years old. In its judgment, the Court found that Sweden had not violated the right to privacy (Article 8 
ECHR), particularly holding that there had not been a ‘significant flaw’ in the Swedish regulatory 
framework and its application in practice. Despite the fact that the introduction of a ‘significant flaws’ 
test potentially has major implications for the Court’s positive obligations case-law, the case has largely 
remained under the radar of legal scholars.2 This article will first give an overview of the factual 
background to the case, as well as to the Court’s decision and the dissenting opinion of Judges 
Spielmann, Villiger and Power-Forde. It further argues that the ‘significant flaw’ test has a number of 
problematic aspects and that it amounts to a lowering of standards in the Court’s case-law. Finally, the 
article argues that the referral of the case to the Grand Chamber on 19 November 2012 provides the 
Court with a unique opportunity to re-examine the facts of the case in a more principled way, in line with 
its prior case-law.  
 
 
2. Factual background 
In 2002, at the age of fourteen, the applicant discovered that her stepfather had hidden a video 
camera in the laundry basket in the bathroom, making a buzzing sound and flashing, and directed 
towards the spot where she normally undressed. She took the video camera to her mother, but her 
stepfather took the camera away from her. Subsequently, the applicant saw her mother and stepfather 
burn a film, without being sure whether it was a recording of her. The applicant’s mother reported the 
incident to the police in 2004 when she found out that the applicant’s cousin had also experienced 
incidents with the stepfather. In February 2006, the District Court convicted the stepfather of sexual 
molestation. In October 2007, the stepfather was, however, acquitted on appeal by the Court of Appeal. 
While the Court of Appeal found it unclear whether a recording was actually made, since the 
recording had been burned, it did find it established that the stepfather had put a camera in the 
bathroom and that he had started the recording system when the applicant was about to take a shower, 
with the aim of filming her for a sexual purpose. The Court of Appeal nonetheless did not find that the 
stepfather’s acts legally constituted the offence of sexual molestation under the Swedish Penal Code. In 
order to qualify as sexual molestation, it had to be established that the stepfather had acted with the 
intent that the applicant would find out about the filming. According to the Court of Appeal, this was not 
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the case as it was apparent that the stepfather’s motive was to film her covertly and that he had not 
been indifferent to the risk that she might find out about the act. The Court of Appeal did not find it 
material that the applicant indeed had found out about the filming, as this knowledge was not covered 
by the stepfather’s intent. The Court of Appeal further referred to a Supreme Court judgment, in which 
the Supreme Court had held that the filming of sexual abuse was as such not an offence because 
Swedish law did not contain a general prohibition against filming an individual without his or her 
consent. While the Court of Appeal acknowledged that there had been a violation of the applicant’s 
personal integrity, particularly in the light of her age and of her relationship to her stepfather, it 
nonetheless held that the stepfather could not be held criminally responsible for the isolated act of 
filming the applicant without her knowledge. The Court of Appeal further held that the stepfather’s act 
might, at least theoretically, have constituted an offence of attempted child pornography, considering 
the applicant’s age. The Court of Appeal, however, could not consider whether the stepfather could have 
been held responsible for such a crime, as no such charges had been brought against him. In December 
2007, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal. 
 
3. The judgment 
A. Characterisation complaint and the applicability of Article 8 ECHR 
The applicant complained both under Article 8 (the right to respect for private life) and under 
Article 13 ECHR (the right to an effective remedy). The Court, however, considered the case to be more 
appropriately examined under Article 8, as the complaint was entirely directed against the remedies 
available to her and as it did not concern the lack of a remedy against the state to enforce the substance 
of a Convention right or freedom at the national level.3 The Court held that the case came within the 
scope of Article 8 ECHR, because the applicant’s complaint concerned her moral integrity, which is an 
element of the broader concept of ‘private life’.4 
The choice of Article 8 rather than of Article 13 in this kind of case, where the applicant 
complains that the alleged lack of protection inter alia stems from an alleged shortcoming in the 
regulatory framework, is in line with the Court’s practice. The Court has always examined the question 
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whether the regulatory framework should prohibit a certain conduct (in this case the covert filming of a 
naked minor) under the substantive right (in this case Article 8) and not under Article 13.5 In such 
situations the Court generally does not consider it necessary to examine separately the specific 
‘remedial’ concerns under Article 13.6 
 
B. The Court’s general principles 
Subsequently, the Court listed the general principles applicable to the case. Firstly, the Court 
stated that positive obligations under Article 8 ECHR may involve the adoption of measures designed to 
secure respect for private life even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves.7 
Secondly, the Court recalled that the choice of means calculated to secure compliance with Article 8 
ECHR in the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves is in principle a matter that falls 
within the Contracting States’ margin of appreciation. The margin of appreciation is, however, narrowed 
where a particularly important facet of an individual’s existence or identity is at stake, or where the 
activities at stake involve a most intimate aspect of private life.8 Thirdly, the Court held that states are 
required to maintain and apply in practice an adequate legal framework affording protection against acts 
of violence by private individuals. While effective deterrence against grave acts where fundamental 
values and essential aspects of private life are at stake requires efficient criminal law provisions, civil law 
may be sufficient as to less grave acts.9 Fourthly, according to the Court only ‘significant flaws’ in 
legislation and practice, and their application, would amount to a breach of the state’s positive 
obligations under Article 8 ECHR. In particular, it is not the task of the Court to replace the domestic 
authorities in their assessment of the facts of the case or in their assessment of the alleged perpetrator’s 
criminal responsibility.10 
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C. The Court’s application of these principles to the facts of the case 
The Court then applied the general principles to the facts of the case. According to the Court, 
there were no indications that it was clear to the authorities, notably to the public prosecutor, when 
indicting the stepfather, or to the District Court, when convicting him, that the disputed act would not be 
covered by the provision on sexual molestation.11 The Court recalled that the Court of Appeal, while 
acquitting the stepfather of sexual molestation, had pointed out that the stepfather’s acts might, at least 
theoretically, have constituted an attempted child pornography crime. The Court of Appeal, however, 
could not consider whether the stepfather could be held responsible for such a crime, as no such charge 
had been brought against him. The Government claimed that it would have been difficult to establish 
that there had been an attempted child pornography crime, as that would have required at least a 
picture of a pornographic nature, which did not exist since the video tape had been destroyed by the 
applicant’s mother.12 According to the Court, it was not its task to speculate on why a charge of 
attempted child pornography had not been brought against the stepfather. In particular, the Court held 
that the authorities could obviously not be held responsible for the lack of evidence in the form of a film, 
nor for the possibility that other elements might also have been lacking for the offence to have 
constituted an attempted child pornography crime. In any event, the Court recalled that only ‘significant 
flaws’ in legislation and practice, and their application, can constitute a breach of the state’s positive 
obligations under Article 8 ECHR.13  
The Court therefore held that it could not be concluded that at the relevant time the disputed 
act of the stepfather was not in theory covered by the Penal Code, as it could fall within the provisions 
concerning sexual molestation and attempted child pornography. The Court further held that the case 
had to be distinguished from X and Y v. the Netherlands,14 as there had not been any procedural 
requirements that made it impossible for the applicant to enjoy practical and effective protection by the 
Penal Code. Moreover, as opposed to K.U. v. Finland,15 there were no obstacles for which the authorities 
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could be held responsible to launching an effective investigation to identify and prosecute the 
perpetrator.16 
The Court then turned to the question whether, in the special circumstances of the case, it was a 
‘significant flaw’ in Swedish legislation that the Penal Code did not contain another provision that could 
have covered the act at issue. More concretely, it could be argued that if the Penal Code at the relevant 
time had contained specific provisions concerning acts of covert or illicit filming, completed and 
attempted, such provisions could also have covered the act at issue in the present case. With respect to 
that assessment, the Court recalled that civil law remedies were also available to the applicant, but that 
she chose to join her claim for damages to the criminal proceedings.17 
The Court emphasised that it was not its task to review the relevant legislation in the abstract – 
particularly the absence in Swedish legislation of specific provisions concerning acts of covert or illicit 
filming18 – but that it must confine itself to examining whether, in the case at hand, the absence of a 
provision in the Penal Code on attempted covert filming constituted a ‘significant flaw’ in Swedish 
legislation. According to the Court, the relevant question was whether the legislators should have 
foreseen that in a case of attempted covert filming of a minor for a sexual purpose, where the film was 
subsequently destroyed without anyone having seen it, and where the person who filmed did not intend 
the minor to find out about the filming, the provision of sexual molestation could not cover the act, and 
a charge of attempted child pornography would not necessarily be brought.19 
The Court reiterated the principle that only the law can define a crime and prescribe a penalty 
(nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege) and the principle that the criminal law must not be extensively 
construed to an accused’s detriment, for instance by analogy. An offence must therefore be clearly 
defined in the law. However, in any system of law, including criminal law, it must be accepted that, 
however clearly drafted a legal provision may be, there is an inevitable element of judicial 
interpretation.20 The Court reaffirmed that the choice of means calculated to secure compliance with 
Article 8 ECHR is in principle a matter that falls within the Contracting States’ margin of appreciation.21 
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The Court, referring to Von Hannover v. Germany,22 stressed the need for increased vigilance in 
protecting private life to contend with new communication technologies which make it possible to store 
and reproduce personal data. The Court particularly took into account that Sweden had taken active 
steps in order to combat the general problem of covert filming of individuals by issuing a proposal to 
criminalise certain acts of such filming in situations where the act violates the personal integrity of the 
filmed person.23 
In the light of these considerations and taking into account the special circumstances of the case 
– notably the fact that at the relevant time the disputed act of the stepfather was in theory covered by 
the provisions concerning sexual molestation and attempted child pornography – the Court held that the 
Swedish legislation and practice and their application to the case at hand did not suffer from such 
‘significant flaws’ that it could amount to a breach of Sweden’s positive obligations under Article 8 
ECHR.24 The Court therefore found that there had not been a violation of Article 8 ECHR.25 
The novelty of the E.S. v. Sweden judgment lies in the decisive character attributed to the 
‘significant flaws’ test (see section 4.B.), resulting in the provision of less protection to the applicant. In 
the next sections, this paper will criticise the application of the ‘significant flaws’ test (see section 4.C) 
and instead propose a stricter standard of effectiveness (see section 4.D). Applying this stricter standard 
would result in the overruling by the Grand Chamber of the Chamber judgment (see section 5). 
 
D. The dissenting opinion 
In a dissenting opinion, Judges Spielmann, Villiger and Power-Forde argued that the Court should 
have found a violation of Article 8 ECHR. Basing themselves on the leading case of X and Y v. the 
Netherlands, the dissenting judges held that a breach of Article 8 requires two conditions: (i) that the 
case concerns fundamental values and essential aspects of private and/or family life; and (ii) that there is 
a lacuna in the legislation which fails to protect these values. As regards the first condition, the judges 
held that it was indisputable that what was in issue was a very serious offence and, indeed, one where 
fundamental values and essential aspects of the applicant’s private life were at stake. As regards the 
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second condition, the dissenters note that the Court of Appeal had found that what the applicant’s 
stepfather had done did not amount to a crime under Swedish law since there was no general 
prohibition against filming an individual without his or her consent. According to the dissenters, the 
Court of Appeal had thereby acknowledged that there was a lacuna in the Swedish legislation. The 
dissenters further had difficulties with accepting the principle, as applied by the Court of Appeal, that for 
a criminal offence to have been committed, the victim must have knowledge of the offence. In the 
dissenters’ minds, both the mens rea and the actus rea were sufficiently present once the domestic 
courts accepted that the stepfather had intended to film the applicant secretly and had proceeded to do 
so. Finally, the dissenters were not aware of any reasons why the stepfather had not been prosecuted on 
other grounds, namely on account of attempted child pornography. On the whole, the dissenters found 
that there had been a significant omission in the relevant Swedish legislation which resulted in the 
applicant being left without protection. 
 
E. Referral to Grand Chamber 
Unsurprisingly, in the light of the clear division in the Chamber – a majority judgment of four 
Judges versus a dissenting judgment of three Judges – the Grand Chamber panel of five Judges decided 
on 19 November 2012 to refer the case to the Grand Chamber at the applicant’s request. During the 
proceedings before the Grand Chamber, the name of the case was changed to Söderman v. Sweden. 
 
4. Implications for the Court’s positive obligations case-law 
A. The positive obligation to develop a regulatory framework protecting human rights 
It is apparent from the Court’s case-law with respect to the positive obligation to protect 
individuals against other private parties that member states have to provide individuals with some 
degree of legal protection in order to prevent their human rights from being violated. In this sense, Keir 
Starmer has held that 
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The duty to put in place a legal framework which provides effective protection for Convention 
rights in many respects represents the minimum obligation of Contracting States under the 
Convention.26 
Similarly, Dimitris Xenos has stressed that 
In most circumstances, a regulatory framework can be imposed as a core content of positive 
obligations under paragraph 1 of the Convention rights. Regulations of human rights standards 
to educate the behaviour of private parties or to condition the operation of their activities are 
the first and most basic content of positive obligations.27 
As rightly stressed by Judges Spielmann, Villiger and Power-Forde in their dissenting opinion, the 
leading case in this respect is the 1985 judgment of X and Y v. the Netherlands. This case concerned the 
rape of a mentally disabled girl by the son-in-law of the director of the home she stayed in. The victim’s 
father had lodged a criminal complaint against the son-in-law for the offence of abuse of a dominant 
position to cause a minor to commit indecent acts. The complaint was, however, dismissed by the 
domestic courts since Dutch law required it to be lodged by the victim herself. This had been impossible 
because, being mentally disabled, she was legally incapable of lodging such a complaint. In its judgment, 
the European Court of Human Rights found  
that the protection afforded by the civil law in the case of wrongdoing of the kind inflicted on 
Miss Y is insufficient. This is a case where fundamental values and essential aspects of private life 
are at stake. Effective deterrence is indispensable in this area and it can be achieved only by 
criminal-law provisions; indeed, it is by such provisions that the matter is normally regulated.28 
In the circumstances of the case, the Court held that the relevant provisions of the Criminal Code did not 
provide the applicant ‘with practical and effective protection’.29 
While protection against serious violations of human rights requires criminal law provisions, the 
protection afforded by civil law may be sufficient with respect to less grave acts, for example in the 
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sphere of medical negligence.30 The protection offered by the regulatory framework should thus be 
proportionate to the seriousness of the human rights violation concerned.31 
The judgment of E.S. v. Sweden raises the question as to which standards the Court should apply 
when determining whether or not a state has failed to discharge this positive obligation to develop a 
regulatory framework protecting against human rights violations by private parties. According to the 
majority, the relevant standard is whether there had been a ‘significant flaw’ in legislation or practice, or 
in their application. The finding of such a ‘significant flaw’ thus results in the finding of a violation of 
Article 8 ECHR. In the dissenting Judges view, on the other hand, it is sufficient to find that there is a 
lacuna in the legislation that results in a failure to protect ‘fundamental values and essential aspects’ of 
private life. In order to determine the most appropriate standard to deal with this kind of cases, I will 
first trace the origins of the ‘significant flaws’ test (section 4.B) and then show that its application in the 
E.S. v. Sweden judgment amounts to a lowering of standards in the Court’s case-law (section 4.C). Then I 
will argue in favour of a stricter standard, in line with the Court’s established case-law (section 4.D). 
 
B. The origins of the ‘significant flaws’ test 
In the majority judgment, the Court identifies the ‘significant flaws’ test as one of the general 
principles applicable to the case at hand. In elevating the ‘significant flaws’ test to a general principle, the 
Court refers to the authority of M.C. v. Bulgaria. This case concerned the date rape of a fourteen-year-
old girl by two men. The prosecutor decided not to start criminal proceedings because the use of force or 
threats had not been established beyond reasonable doubt and, in particular, it had not been established 
that the applicant had resisted the perpetrators or attempted to seek help from others. The European 
Court of Human Rights held that it was its task 
to examine whether or not the impugned legislation and practice and their application in the 
case at hand, combined with the alleged shortcomings in the investigation, had such significant 
                                                          
30
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flaws as to amount to a breach of the respondent State's positive obligations under Articles 3 
and 8 of the Convention.32 
In M.C. v. Bulgaria, the Court, however, made no further use of the notion of ‘significant flaws’, nor did it 
elaborate on what had to be understood by this notion. In finding a violation of Articles 3 and 8 ECHR, 
the Court merely held that 
the approach taken by the investigator and the prosecutors in the case fell short of the 
requirements inherent in the States' positive obligations – viewed in the light of the relevant 
modern standards in comparative and international law – to establish and apply effectively a 
criminal-law system punishing all forms of rape and sexual abuse.33 
Before E.S. v. Sweden, the Court had mentioned the notion of ‘significant flaws’ in two more 
cases. In the domestic servitude case of Siliadin v. France, the Court held that it had  
to examine whether the impugned legislation and its application in the case in issue had such 
significant flaws as to amount to a breach of Article 4 by the respondent State.34  
The Court found a violation of Article 4 ECHR, particularly because it considered 
that the criminal-law legislation in force at the material time did not afford the applicant, a 
minor, practical and effective protection against the actions of which she was a victim.35 
In the case of M. and C. v. Romania, concerning the sexual abuse of a four-year-old by his father, 
the Court considered its task to be  
to examine whether or not the alleged shortcomings in the investigation had such significant 
flaws as to amount to a breach of the respondent State’s positive obligations under Articles 3 
and 8 of the Convention in respect of the second applicant.36 
The Court found a violation of Articles 3 and 8 ECHR, particularly holding  
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that the investigation of the case and, in particular, the approach taken by the domestic 
authorities fell short of the requirements inherent in the States’ positive obligations to establish 
and effectively apply a criminal-law system punishing all forms of sexual abuse.37 
In neither Siliadin nor M. and C. did the Court further mention the notion of ‘significant flaws’, nor did it 
clarify what had to be understood by it. 
It thus appears that before E.S. v. Sweden, the notion of ‘significant flaws’ did not have any 
specific content and this notion’s mention did not have any influence on the Court’s further reasoning. 
Holding that it had to examine whether there had been ‘significant flaws’ in legislation or practice, or 
their application, was just another way for the Court to put that it had to examine whether the state had 
failed to provide the applicants effective protection. As we will see hereunder, ‘effective protection’ is 
exactly the stricter standard that in general emerges from the Court’s positive obligations jurisprudence 
(see section 4.D). 
In E.S. v. Sweden, however, the Court for the first time applies the notion of ‘significant flaws’ as 
a separate test in order to verify whether the state has failed to discharge its positive obligations. In its 
examination, the Court considers three issues not to constitute a ‘significant flaw’. Firstly, the Court 
accepted that the disputed act was ‘in theory’ covered by the offence of sexual molestation. The Court 
thus did not consider the fact that, in order to qualify as such an offence, Swedish law required that the 
perpetrator had the intent that the victim would find out about the act, to be a ‘significant flaw’. 
Secondly, the Court further accepted that the act was ‘in theory’ covered by the offence of attempted 
child pornography. The Court did not consider the evidentiary issues – in particular the alleged 
requirement of evidence in the form of a picture of a pornographic nature – to constitute a ‘significant 
flaw’. Thirdly, the Court did not consider it to be a ‘significant flaw’ in Swedish legislation that the Penal 
Code did not contain another provision that could have covered the act at issue, in particular a specific 
provision concerning acts of covert or illicit filming, either completed or attempted. 
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C. The problematic nature of the ‘significant flaws’ test 
The Court’s application of the ‘significant flaws’ test in E.S. v Sweden has a number of 
problematic aspects. First of all, by introducing the ‘significant flaws’ test, the state’s positive obligation 
is in a sense ‘negativised’: it becomes an obligation not to do something (i.e. allow ‘significant flaws’ in 
legislation), rather than an obligation to do something (i.e. provide effective protection). As such, this 
may not be so problematic, on condition that there is sufficient certainty with respect to the content of 
this ‘negative’ criterion. In the absence of any criteria as to what counts as a ‘significant flaw’, such an 
approach fails to provide any guidance as to what does amount to sufficient legal protection of human 
rights. The Court’s judgment, however, did not give sufficient guidance in the abstract as to what could 
be regarded as a ‘significant flaw’. It merely gave three examples of what did not count as a ‘significant 
flaw’ in the case at hand. 
 Secondly, the application of the ‘significant flaws’ test in E.S. v. Sweden indicates that this test is 
particularly tailored to deal with situations in which the lack of protection clearly stems from one 
particular legal loophole. An example of such a situation would be the above-discussed case of M.C. v. 
Bulgaria, in which the lack of protection directly and entirely stemmed from the restrictive definition of 
rape under Bulgarian law, which did not cover non-consensual sexual acts in the absence of physical 
resistance by the victim. In E.S. v. Sweden, the situation is different, since the lack of protection stems 
from a combination of three factors: the problems related to establishing whether the stepfather had 
committed sexual molestation, those related to the establishment of attempted child pornography and 
the absence of a specific provision concerning acts of covert or illicit filming. Even if none of these factors 
in themselves constituted such a ‘significant flaw’, this does not discharge the Court from examining 
whether their combination might have resulted in a situation in which the rights of the applicant were 
not sufficiently protected. This appears to be exactly the problem in this case: not the absence of any of 
these means of protection in particular, but rather the fact that none of them provided protection in 
practice in the case at hand. The suggested approach, moreover, would be more in line with the margin 
of appreciation doctrine (see section 4.D): it is not for the Court to identify the particular course of 
remedial action (by identifying a particular ‘significant flaw’), since, as the Court reaffirmed in E.S. v. 
Sweden, the choice of means to ensure compliance with a positive obligation in principle falls within the 
state’s margin of appreciation.38 If the Court had found a violation of Article 8, it would still be up to the 
                                                          
38
 E.S. v. Sweden, supra note 1, para. 70. 
 14 
 
state to decide either to tackle any of the three discussed problems or to adopt any other adequate 
course of action. 
Thirdly, the application of the ‘significant flaws’ test is overly deferential. In its case-law the 
Court has always stressed that ‘[t]he Convention is intended to guarantee not rights that are theoretical 
or illusory but rights that are practical and effective’.39 In this light, it is strange that the Court accepts the 
argument that Swedish criminal law ‘in theory’ – rather than in practice – provided sufficient 
protection.40 As I will illustrate in the next section, the Court has always applied a standard of 
effectiveness in cases concerning the positive obligation to provide legal protection. The ‘significant 
flaws’ test is hard to reconcile with the principle of effectiveness, which requires effective legal 
protection against human rights violations. In the context of the positive obligation under Article 2 ECHR 
(the right to life) to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk, 
the Court has, for example, invoked the principle of effectiveness to reject standards comparable to the 
‘significant flaws’ test. According to the Court, the standards suggested by the Government in Osman v. 
United Kingdom – whether there had been ‘gross negligence’ or ‘wilful disregard of the duty to protect 
life’ – were incompatible with the need to provide practical and effective protection of the right to life.41 
On a spectrum, protection is not either effective or ‘significantly flawed’: between both points on the 
spectrum, there are other positions in which insufficient protection is provided. As the ‘significant flaws’ 
test would not result in the finding of a violation with respect to these other positions, the introduction 
of this test in E.S. v. Sweden thus amounts to a lowering of standards in the Court’s jurisprudence. 
Fourthly, the judgment is hard to reconcile with the priority-to-rights principle. This principle 
requires that Convention rights be systematically accorded greater weight than collective goods in the 
proportionality analysis.42 As early as the Belgian Linguistics case, the Court recognised that ‘[t]he 
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 E.g. ECtHR 9 October 1979, Airey v. Ireland, para. 24. For two recent Grand Chamber authorities, see ECtHR (GC) 
17 January 2012, Stanev v. Bulgaria, para. 231, and ECtHR (GC) 7 June 2012, Centro Europa 7 S.R.L. and Di Stefano 
v. Italy, para. 138. 
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 As the legal opinion of Professor of Criminal Law Leijonhufvud (supra note 12) illustrates, the Court has all too 
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 ECtHR (GC) 28 October 1998, Osman v. United Kingdom, para. 116: ‘The Court does not accept the Government’s 
view that the failure to perceive the risk to life in the circumstances known at the time or to take preventive 
measures to avoid that risk must be tantamount to gross negligence or wilful disregard of the duty to protect life … 
Such a rigid standard must be considered to be incompatible with the requirements of Article 1 of the Convention 
and the obligations of Contracting States under that Article to secure the practical and effective protection of the 
rights and freedoms laid down therein, including Article 2.’ 
42
 S. Greer, Constitutionalizing Adjudication under the European Convention on Human Rights, 23 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 413-414 (2003). 
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Convention […] implies a just balance between the protection of the general interest of the Community 
and the respect due to fundamental human rights while attaching particular importance to the latter’.43 
Protection of Convention rights can thus be considered as the rule, while justified limitations are the 
exception.44 The priority-to-rights principle thus principally favours human rights protection over 
competing interests and there is no principled reason why the same is not equally relevant in the context 
of positive obligations, as in the context of negative obligations. The priority-to-rights principle is also 
reflected in the burden of proof: the principle requires the state to bear the burden of proving the 
proportionality of any limitation of a Convention right.45 With respect to positive obligations, once it is 
established that a situation interferes with a Convention right, the priority-to-rights principle mutatis 
mutandis requires states to bear the burden of proof that their inactions do not violate the Convention 
right concerned.46 In E.S. v. Sweden, however, the Court failed to respect the priority-to-rights principle, 
by finding that there is generally no violation of a Convention right unless it is established that there has 
been a ‘significant flaw’ in the regulatory framework or its application. Such a test by its nature requires 
the applicant to provide the positive proof of the existence of a ‘significant flaw’ rather than requiring 
the state to provide the negative proof of the absence of a ‘significant flaw’. The applicant is thus placed 
at a disadvantaged position vis-à-vis the state, since the applicant has to provide both proof of the 
interference and proof of the existence of a ‘significant flaw’. This creates a presumption that the state 
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 ECtHR (GC) 23 July 1968, Case ‘relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in 
Belgium’ v. Belgium, para. 5. 
44
 S. Smet, The Nature and Form of Conflicts between Human Rights in the Case Law of the European Court of 
Human Rights 40 (manuscript on file). 
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 Greer, supra note 42, 428. Similarly, S. Van Drooghenbroeck, Conflits entre droits fondamentaux, pondération 
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September 2012, Nada v. Switzerland, para. 181 (the need for the State to adduce ‘relevant and sufficient’ reasons 
for justifying an interference); and ECtHR 24 April 2012, Yordanova and Others v. Bulgaria, para. 118 (inferences 
drawn from a lack of explanation or argumentation justifying interference). Related to the burden of proof is the 
axiom in dubio pro libertate: any remaining doubt as to the necessity of a limitation will play to the benefit of the 
Convention right concerned, see Smet, supra note 44, p. 40, with reference to F. Ost and S. Van Drooghenbroeck, 
La responsabilité face cachée des droits de l’homme, in: H. Dumont, F. Ost and S. Van Drooghenbroeck (eds), La 
responsabilité face cachée des droits de l’homme 33-34 (Brussels: Bruylant, 2005). 
46
 L. Lavrysen, The Scope of Rights and the Scope of Obligations: Positive Obligations, in: E. Brems and J. Gerards 
(eds), Shaping Rights in the ECHR – The Role of the European Court of Human Rights in Determining the Scope of 
Human Rights (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). Similarly G. van der Schyff, Limitation of Rights – A Study 
of the European Convention and the South African Bill of Rights 69 (Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2005); and J. 
Gerards and H. Senden, The Structure of Fundamental Rights and the European Court of Human Rights, 7 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 644 (2009). 
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has discharged its positive obligations, which is contrary to the priority-to-rights principle, since it 
exempts the state from bearing the burden of proof in the proportionality analysis.47 
A more promising approach is a line of legal reasoning developed by the Court in the case of K.U. 
v. Finland. The case concerned the posting by an anonymous person of the contact details of a twelve-
year-old boy on an internet dating site, which exposed the boy to the interest of sexual predators. When 
examining the extent of the positive obligation under Article 8 ECHR, the Court held that ‘a positive 
obligation must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate 
burden on the authorities or, as in this case, the legislator’.48 If the state fails to establish that there has 
been such an ‘impossible or disproportionate burden’, the Court will find that there has been a violation 
of the Convention right concerned. It is disappointing that the Court in E.S. v. Sweden applied a 
‘significant flaw’ test, rather than the stricter ‘impossible or disproportionate burden’ test, which would 
have been more in line with the priority-to-rights principle. 
Fifthly, in the case of Broniowski v. Poland concerning positive obligations under Article 1 
Protocol 1 (the right to property), but equally relevant with respect to positive obligations under Article 
8, the Court held that 
The rule of law underlying the Convention and the principle of lawfulness in Article 1 of Protocol 
No. 1 require States not only to respect and apply, in a foreseeable and consistent manner, the 
laws they have enacted, but also, as a corollary of this duty, to ensure the legal and practical 
conditions for their implementation.49  
The Court could have applied the same type of reasoning to the case of E.S. v. Sweden, in which the legal 
and practical conditions were lacking for the effective application of the criminal law to the challenged 
act, owing to the refusal of domestic courts to hold a perpetrator liable if he did not want the victim to 
find out about the alleged act of sexual molestation and because of the prosecutorial policy not to file 
charges for (attempted) child pornography in the absence of photographic evidence. Moreover, it 
appears that even if there had been photographic evidence, it would have been impossible to bring 
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 It also violates the axiom in dubio pro libertate, since remaining doubt benefits the state rather than the 
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 K.U. v. Finland, supra note 6, para. 48. Another problem may be the possibility of conflicting rights. In such cases, 
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charges for the latter offence, since it was unlikely that the film could have been considered 
‘pornographic’ under Swedish law.50 It cannot therefore be accepted that the regulatory framework, as 
applied in practice, was able to provide the applicant with the requisite protection, owing to the 
interpretation given by the domestic courts to the relevant offences and/or the restrictive prosecutorial 
policy. 
Sixthly, the lack of protection in practice stands in contrast to the international consensus on the 
need to protect children effectively against such practices through criminal law. The Optional Protocol to 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child 
pornography (‘Optional Protocol’)51 requires states to criminalise inter alia the production and 
possession of child pornography52 as well as an attempt to commit such act.53 The Optional Protocol 
requires states to adopt appropriate measures to protect the rights and interests of child victims of the 
practices prohibited under the Protocol at all stages of the criminal justice process.54 At the level of the 
Council of Europe, the Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual 
Abuse (‘Council of Europe Convention’)55 equally requires the criminalisation of the production and 
possession of child pornography.56 The Convention inter alia requires states to take the necessary 
legislative or other measures to ensure that investigations and criminal proceedings are carried out in 
the best interests and respecting the rights of the child.57 Both the Optional Protocol and the Council of 
Europe Convention would be futile in the absence of the effective investigation and prosecution of the 
offences concerned.58 These instruments illustrate an international consensus on the need to criminalise 
and effectively investigate and prosecute sexual crimes against minors. In line with this consensus, the 
Court should avoid a deferential approach with respect to such crimes and instead apply firm legal 
standards. The Court should have found that, by not allowing criminal liability with respect to acts that 
arguably come within the scope of the Optional Protocol and the Council of Europe Convention, the 
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Swedish regulatory framework failed to live up to the international consensus to protect effectively 
against such crimes. 
 
D. The standard from the Court’s case-law: effective protection 
The principle of effectiveness requires states to protect rights that are practical and effective, rather than 
theoretical or illusory.59 This principle is a general interpretative principle the European Court applies 
when determining the extent of protection under the ECHR.60 It is particularly important in the Court’s 
positive obligations case-law, in which it has been the primary rationale for the development of positive 
obligations under almost every Convention article.61 As I will argue in the next section, the Grand 
Chamber should remain faithful to the Court’s established case-law on the positive obligation to provide 
legal protection of human rights against third parties, by applying the standard that legal protection 
must be effective rather than devoid of ‘significant flaws’. 
The principle of effectiveness is prominent in the leading case of X and Y v. the Netherlands, 
where the Court required ‘effective deterrence’ of the human rights violation concerned and where it 
found that the applicant did not enjoy ‘practical and effective protection’ by the Criminal Code.62 In M.C. 
v. Bulgaria, the Court held that Article 8 requires states to enact criminal-law provisions ‘effectively 
punishing’ rape and to apply them in practice through ‘effective investigation and prosecution’.63 In 
Siliadin v. France, the Court held that the criminal-law legislation in force did not afford the applicant 
‘practical and effective protection’ against servitude, in violation of Article 4 ECHR.64 In the trafficking 
case of Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, the Court held that Article 4 ECHR requires that the spectrum of 
safeguards set out in national legislation must be adequate to ensure the ‘practical and effective 
protection’ of the rights of the victims or potential victims of trafficking.65 In K.U. v. Finland, the Court 
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 E.g. Airey, supra note 39, para. 24. 
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held that the ‘practical and effective protection’ of the right to privacy (Article 8 ECHR) of the applicant 
required the taking of ‘effective steps’ to identify and prosecute the perpetrator.66 
In all these cases, the standard of effectiveness is applied to examine whether the state has 
discharged its positive obligation, both with respect to the regulatory framework and to the legal and 
practical conditions for the prosecution and punishment of perpetrators (see above section 4.C). The 
former sometimes requires more than the simple criminalisation of a human rights violation: effective 
protection against trafficking also requires the regulation of businesses used as a cover for human 
trafficking and the development of immigration rules that do not encourage, facilitate or tolerate 
trafficking.67 The former also requires that criminal provisions that ‘in theory’ may protect against a 
human rights violation are interpreted and applied in such a way that effective protection is provided: in 
the case of M.C. v. Bulgaria, for example, the issue is not the law itself, but the restrictive application of 
the crime of rape in the applicant’s case, due to a prosecutorial policy.68 The latter may, for example, 
require the provision of investigative techniques, such as an obligation on internet service providers to 
provide information on the identity of anonymous offenders on the internet.69  
In general terms, in this type of case the principle of effectiveness requires at the basic level the 
existence of a measure capable of providing individuals protection against human rights violations by 
private actors. While absolute protection is not required, as positive obligations are obligations of means 
rather than obligations of result,70 the principle of effectiveness does require that the state strives to 
provide as much protection as can reasonably be expected from them.71 According to Xenos, ‘the choice 
of measures is reviewed against the standard of effectiveness, which aims, consciously or unconsciously, 
at an end/complete result’,72 in particular the end result ‘not to suffer a violation of human rights by a 
given activity’.73 In other words, the principle of effectiveness requires an appropriate means-ends 
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relationship. While the Court holds that the choice of means to discharge a positive obligation generally 
falls within the state’s margin of appreciation,74 the protection offered by these means must nonetheless 
be effective. The principle of effectiveness, in combination with the margin of appreciation doctrine, thus 
delineates a range of means that are appropriate to protect human rights. If the state fails to use a 
means at its disposal or if it applies a means that for whatever reason is not capable of appropriately 
protecting the right concerned in practice, the state has failed to discharge its positive obligation, unless 
it can justify the proportionality of its inaction, in line with the priority-to-rights principle. 
 
5. Rearguing E.S. v Sweden 
The referral of the case to the Grand Chamber is a unique opportunity for the Court to overrule the E.S. 
v. Sweden judgment. It therefore is crucial that the Grand Chamber asks the right question. Instead of 
asking whether there were any ‘significant flaws’ in the regulatory framework or its application, the 
Grand Chamber should ask whether the protection offered in practice by the regulatory framework and 
its application was effective in the sense of X and Y v. the Netherlands or not. In order to verify whether 
there has been a violation of Article 8, the Court has to examine three distinct questions. 
The first question is whether the challenged act was sufficiently serious to trigger the need for 
the State to develop and apply a regulatory framework to protect against such acts and to punish 
perpetrators. Clearly there was such a need, taking into account the nature of the challenged act as 
sexual abuse of a minor. In this respect, the Court in K.U. v. Finland had held that  
sexual abuse is unquestionably an abhorrent type of wrongdoing, with debilitating effects on its 
victims. Children and other vulnerable individuals are entitled to State protection, in the form of 
effective deterrence, from such grave types of interference with essential aspects of their private 
lives.75 
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The seriousness was also acknowledged by the domestic courts, which had established that the 
stepfather had committed an act violating the applicant’s personal integrity. The Court’s jurisprudence, 
moreover, indicates that sexual abuse of minors principally requires criminal law sanctions.76 
 The applicant was thus in principle entitled to effective protection by the regulatory framework, 
in particular by the criminal law. The second question then is whether applicant did enjoy such effective 
protection in practice. As held above, the starting point of this analysis is that the state has a certain 
margin of appreciation to determine the means to provide the applicant with protection, insofar as this 
protection can be considered effective in the sense of X and Y v. the Netherlands. 
 The prosecution and – if his criminal responsibility had been established by the domestic courts77 
– conviction of the stepfather for the offences of sexual molestation or (attempted) child pornography 
would undoubtedly have been an appropriate means to protect the applicant’s right to privacy. It is 
important to note that the obligation to apply the regulatory framework in practice through prosecution 
is not an obligation of result, but an obligation of means to take all reasonable steps possible to 
successfully prosecute the perpetrator of a human rights violation.78 The mere fact that the stepfather 
was not convicted is thus not sufficient to find a violation of the right to privacy. As the Court held in 
M.C. v. Bulgaria, it is ‘not concerned with allegations of errors or isolated omissions in the 
investigation’.79 Severe shortcomings in the investigation and prosecution,80 or a prosecutorial or judicial 
policy that excludes the challenged act from the sphere of protection, will, however, in principle result in 
the finding of a violation. 
In this case, the protection offered by the offence of sexual molestation was clearly ineffective, 
since it did not apply in the situation where the perpetrator did not intend the victim to find out about 
the offence – which necessarily holds true for cases of covert filming – despite the fact that the violation 
of the victim’s personal integrity was nonetheless established. This ineffectiveness was caused by the 
Court of Appeal’s restrictive interpretation,81 which rightly stunned the dissenting judges, who held that 
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‘both the mens rea and the actus rea were sufficiently present once the domestic courts accepted that 
the stepfather had intended to film the applicant secretly and had proceeded to do so’. The offence of 
(attempted) child pornography also did not provide effective protection, since the act does not appear to 
be ‘pornographic’ under Swedish law. Even if it had been covered by that provision, the protection 
would have been ineffective since prosecutorial practice required evidence of a photographic nature, 
including in the applicant’s case where the facts had been clearly established by the domestic courts 
despite the video evidence having been destroyed. The question remained whether there were other 
effective means at the state’s disposal. Regardless of the question whether criminalising covert or illicit 
filming would be an appropriate means to protect against a personal integrity violation rather than a 
mere privacy violation, such a means did not exist in Swedish law, nor did any other effective means.  
The third and final question is whether protecting the applicant would impose an ‘impossible or 
disproportionate burden’ on the state, in the sense of K.U. v. Finland. In line with the priority-to-rights-
principle, the burden lies on the state to justify its failure to provide an effective means of protection. 
Since the Swedish state did not demonstrate such an ‘impossible or disproportionate’ burden, the Grand 
Chamber should therefore find a violation of Article 8 ECHR. 
The Grand Chamber judgment in the case of E.S. v. Sweden (or Söderman v. Sweden) is likely to 
become a leading case in the Court’s positive obligations case-law. As a regulatory framework can indeed 
rightly be considered the ‘first and most basic content’ of positive obligations to protect the human 
rights of individuals against private actors,82 it is important for the Court to take a firm position on the 
development of this framework, as well as its application. In line with Broniowski v. Poland, the latter 
also requires the state to ensure the appropriate legal and practical conditions for its application in 
practice. In order to take such a firm position, it is crucial for the Grand Chamber to drop the ‘significant 
flaws’ test and to endorse unambiguously the principles of effectiveness and priority-to-rights. That way, 
the Grand Chamber would provide a more appropriate level of protection against human rights 
violations by private actors in general and against the sexual abuse of minors in particular. 
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